In this paper we consider an infinite horizon zero-sum differential game where the dynamics of each player and the running cost are also depending on the evolution of some discrete (switching) variables. In particular, such switching variables evolve according to the switching law of a so-called thermostatic delayed relay, applied to the players' states. We first address the problem of the continuity of both lower and upper value function. Then, by a suitable representation of the problem as a coupling of several exit-time differential games, we characterize those value functions as, respectively, the unique solution of a coupling of several Dirichlet problems for Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations. The concept of viscosity solutions and a suitable definition of boundary conditions in the viscosity sense is used in the paper. Finally, we give some sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
that must be reached by the continuous state variable (see Figure 1 , and in general Section 4 for more precise details). Moreover, player X wants to minimize, whereas player Y wants to maximize, a discounted infinite horizon cost of the form J(x, y, w, z, α, β) = +∞ 0 e −λt (X(t), Y (t), W (t), Z(t), α(t), β(t))dt where w, z ∈ {−1, +1} are the initial states of the switching variables.
As usual, following Elliot-Kalton [16] , we define the lower and the upper value functions respectively as V (x, y, w, z) = inf 
where Γ and Ξ are the set of non-anticipating strategies for player X and player Y , respectively. The main goal of the paper is to derive two suitable problems for Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations in such a way to characterize V and V as the unique viscosity solutions of those problems, respectively. As a consequence, we will also get the existence of an equilibrium (i.e. V = V ) under the standard Isaacs condition. To achieve the main goal we perform several steps.
The first step is to prove the continuity in the space variables of the value functions, that is, for every (w, z) ∈ {−1, 1} × {−1, 1} fixed, the continuity of (x, y) → V (x, y, w, z) (here and somewhere in the sequel, by V , we will denote any one of the two value functions (2) , regardless whether it is the lower or the upper one). Under the hypothesis of decoupled dynamics and another decoupling hypothesis on the running cost , such continuity is proved using a suitable construction of nonanticipating strategies. Indeed, in our switching differential game, we need the existence of some non-anticipating strategies which make the players, when they are on a switching threshold, to be able to switch or not (i.e. to cross the threshold or not) in dependence on its convenience. At the same time, such non-anticipating strategies must not penalize the cost too much. In the simpler case of an optimal control problem (one player only) this can be achieved by the Soner's construction of the so-called constrained controls [26] . Indeed, the switching problem with statedependent switching thresholds (as our problem is) is strongly related to state-constraints as well as exit-time problems. However, for the differential game situation, the much strict requirement that the construction of the Soner-like control must be non-anticipating (i.e. non-dependent on future behaviors of the trajectories and of the controls), is a fundamental issue. Such an issue was addressed in the recent work by Bagagiolo-Maggistro-Zoppello [2] . In that work the authors studied (for the first time) an exit-time/exit-costs differential game in the framework of dynamic programming and viscosity solutions theory for Isaacs equations with boundary conditions in the viscosity sense. In particular, the fundamental issue above is there largely treated and solved under the decoupling hypotheses and further controllability hypotheses. In the present work, we are going to make large use of the results of [2] , of which one of the main motivations was, by the way, to arrive to study the thermostatic problem as the one here presented.
The second step is to rewrite our infinite horizon problem as four exit-time/exit-costs problems coupled to each other by the exit costs. More precisely, the state space R n × R m (X, Y ) is divided in four partially overlapped sectors where the switching variables (W, Z) remain constant. In each one of those sectors, the problem is seen as an exit-time differential game with exit costs mutually exchanged with the other sectors: the value function V has been evaluated on the new entered sector when the previous one is left (i.e. one or both switching variable are switched), see Figure 4 . This step is achieved by dynamic programming techniques, using the decoupled feature of the dynamics, a controllability hypothesis and the already proved continuity of V .
The third step is, using the second step above, to write a system of four HJI equations, one for anyone of the four sectors above respectively, and coupled by the boundary conditions (for every sector, the boundary datum is the unknown function on the other sectors). Using the results of [2] on exit-time differential games, the value function V will turn out to be a viscosity solution of such a system, where the boundary conditions are interpreted in a suitable viscosity sense.
The last step is to prove that V is actually the unique solution of the system of HJI equations above. This is achieved by a fixed point procedure, using the uniqueness results of [2] . There, under some hypotheses, it is proved that the value function V for a differential game of exit-time/exitcosts type (when the exit costs are given, not as here, where the exit costs are represented by the unknown solution itself) is the unique solution of a Dirichlet problem for the corresponding HJI equation. In particular, the boundary conditions are interpreted in a suitable viscosity sense that takes account of the min-max feature of the problem and benefits of the decoupling and controllability of the dynamics.
Motivations and literature.
There are different situations that can be interpreted as differential games with dynamics affected by switching. Just think to a pursuit evasion game (see Shinar-Glizer-Turetsky [24, 25] ) where the switching dynamics is either the one of pursuer or the one of the evader. We can also imagine a race between two cars where the switching variable(s) may represent the position of an automatic gears or the diesel/electric regime of an hybrid car as in Dextreit-Kolmanovsky [15] .
Also the well known shallow lake problem that arises in ecological economics (see e.g., Reddy-Schumacher-Engwerda [23] ) can be seen as a differential game with switching dynamics as well as the international pollution problem with evolving environmental costs. Such costs, for less developed countries, change according to their cumulative revenue, see Masoudi-Zaccour [22] . We point out that the above mentioned switching dynamics are also called hybrid dynamics. A recent study of hybrid differential games can be found also in Gromov-Gromova [19] , where the authors formulated necessary optimality conditions for determining optimal strategies in both cooperative and non-cooperative cases. A particular class of differential games with changing structure is also considered in Bonneuil-Boucekkine [10] , where the transition to renewable energy leads to the change of the system's dynamics, and in Kort-Wrzaczek [21] , where the change of a monopolist firm's dynamics is due to the entrance in the market of a firm offering the same products. The switching can occurs not only in the dynamics but also in the cost function as for example in Fabra-Garca [17] where a dynamic competition is analysed and the market prices change.
There are also mathematical motivations that suggest the study of differential games with thermostatic dynamics, that are similar to the ones for studying optimal control problems with thermostatic dynamics (see , Ceragioli-De Persis-Frasca [13] and Bagagiolo-Danieli [1] ). In [3] optimal controls problems with dynamics inside a network are considered. A delay thermostat is introduced to overcome the discontinuity's problem arising when passing from an arc to another one due to the different dynamics and running cost on each branch of the network. In [13] the authors make a rigorous treatment of continuous-time average consensus dynamics with uniform quantization in communications. The consensus is reached by quantized measurement which are transmitted using a delay thermostat. Similarly, in [1] they consider an optimal control problem exhibiting several internal switching variables whose discrete evolutions are governed by some delayed thermostatic laws. A zero-sum differential games involving hybrid controls was also considered in Dharmatti-Ramaswamy [14] . Here, the state of the system is changed discontinuously and the associated lower and upper value functions are characterized as the unique viscosity solutions of the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities. Moreover, they give an Isaacs like condition for the game to have a value.
Up to the knowledge of the present authors, the present work is the first attempt to study a switching/hybrid differential game in the framework of dynamic programming and viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations, and especially in connection with hybrid delayed thermostatic laws and, more in general, state-dependent switching.
In conclusion we refer the reader to Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [4] for a comprehensive account to viscosity solutions theory and applications to optimal control problems and differential games (for differential games see also Buckdahn-Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix [11] ). Moreover other studies on constrained trajectories and non-anticipating strategies as well as on possible relations with optimal control problems and differential games can be found in Koike [20] , Bardi-Koike-Soravia [5] , Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix-Saint Pierre [12] , Bettiol-Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix [6] Bettiol-Bressan-Vinter [8, 7] , Bettiol-Facchi [9] and Frankowska-Marchini-Mazzola [18] .
Plan of the paper. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the hybrid thermostatic delayed relay, and its connection with ordinary differential equations. In Section 3, we briefly review the results in Bagagiolo-Maggistro-Zoppello [2] about exit-time/exit-costs differential games. In Section 4 we state the main assumptions about the infinite horizon switching differential game under study, and we argue about cost estimates on the switching trajectories. In section 5 we prove the continuity of the value functions and give a dynamic programming-like results, connecting the infinite horizon switching problem with exit-time problems. In Section 6 we characterize the value functions as the unique viscosity solutions of the systems of Isaacs equations.
The hybrid thermostatic delayed relay
A hybrid delayed thermostat with thresholds ρ = (ρ −1 , ρ 1 ), ρ −1 < ρ 1 , and initial output w ∈ {−1, 1}, is the operator h ρ [·; w] : C 0 (0, +∞) → L ∞ (0, +∞), X → h ρ [X; w], whose behavior is described by Figure 1 . In particular it maps a time-continuous scalar input X to a measurable time-dependent output function W = h ρ [X; w] which can only takes values in {−1, 1} and whose switching law is the following (see Visintin [27] for a more systematic treatment of the delayed relay)
In other words, looking to Figure 1 , if at certain time τ we have h ρ [X; w](τ ) = −1 (which certainly means X(τ ) ≤ ρ 1 ), then a switch from −1 to 1 can only occur (and must occur) at a possible subsequent time t ≥ τ if and only if, at that time t, the input X crosses, strictly increasing, the upper threshold ρ 1 , being X(t) = ρ 1 In particular, we remark that, at a switching instant t, the value of the output h ρ [X; w](t) is still the previous one (i.e. it is not switched yet) and it will be equal to the new switched one at subsequent instants after t only (if X has crossed the threshold). Finally note that the given initial output w plays a role only if ρ −1 ≤ X(0) ≤ ρ 1 . An important property of the thermostatic delayed relay is the following semigroup property. For every X and w, and for every t, τ ≥ 0, it is
The switching evolution of W = h ρ [X; w] can be also described in the following way. Looking to Figure 1 , we define
which correspond to the sets where the pair (X, W ) can evolve without switching. Given X ∈ C 0 (0, +∞) and w ∈ {−1, +1} such that (X(0), w) ∈ O −1 ∪O 1 , the output h ρ [X; w] is characterized as the unique left-continuous function W such that
where Var [0,t] is the total variation in the interval [0, t] (which, for the delayed thermostat, corresponds to twice the number of switchings in [0, t] (every switching has variation equal to 2)). Hence, the switching law t → W (t) is the unique one that satisfies the constraint (X(t), W (t)) ∈ O −1 ∪ O 1 and, in any time interval, minimizes the number of switchings.
Such interpretation is also useful to define what is a the solution of the switching scalar ordinary differential equation
The solution is the unique function t → (X(t), W (t)) such that: i) X is continuous and W is left continuous; ii) X(t) = x + t 0 f (s, X(s), W (s))ds and (X(t), W (t)) ∈ O −1 ∪ O 1 for all t ≥ 0; iii) minimizes in [0, t] for all t, the number of switchings of W , among all pairs (X,W ) satisfying i) and ii). Such a unique solution can be constructed in the following way: consider the evolution of X 1 , starting from x with dynamics f (·, ·, w), and maintain such evolution until the possible time t 1 of switching for W = h ρ [X 1 ; w]. Then in ]t 1 , +∞[ consider the trajectory X 2 starting from X 1 (t 1 ) with dynamics f (·, ·, −w), and maintain it until the possible time t 2 > t 1 of switching for h ρ [X 2 , −w]. Then, in ]t 2 , +∞[ consider the trajectory X 3 with dynamics f (·, ·, w) and starting from X 2 (t 2 ). Since the switching thresholds are different, ρ −1 < ρ 1 , then the number of those changes of dynamics is bounded in any compact set [0, T ], and hence, gluing together the pieces of trajectories X i , we get the unique solution of (4) defined above.
When the evolution is in R n (as the controlled evolution of the next sections) we are going to suppose that the switching dependence of the dynamics is subject to the evolution of a fixed component of the continuous evolution X ∈ R n : X · ζ where ζ ∈ R n is a unit vector. We then consider the (n + 1)
The previous definition of the switching rule W = h ρ [X; w], as well as the subsequent definition of the solution of (4), is certainly linked to an exit-time feature: for example, a switch from −1 to 1 occurs if and only if the pair (X, W ) exits from the closed set O −1 . And indeed, in the following, we are going to interpret our infinite horizon switching differential games as a coupling of some exit-time differential games with exit from some suitable closed sets. One can also recast the problem as an exit-time problem with exit from an open set. Concerning the switching rule, it corresponds to the immediate switching when the threshold is touched (on the contrary, our definition is when the threshold is bypassed). This, for example, would correspond to the fact that a switch from −1 to 1 occurs if and only if the pair (X, W ) exits from the "open" set ] − ∞, ρ 1 [×{−1, 1}. We use the interpretation as exit from a closed set because it is more prone to treat the Dirichlet problem from the Isaacs equation, since in such a case the boundary is "physically" part of the problem, and it is even viable. However, assuming some suitable controllability conditions, as we are going to do, the two problems (exit from the open set and exit from the closed set), are in general extremely linked to each other, as the corresponding value functions in general coincide in the interior of the set. This fact is certainly known for optimal control problems but we do not investigate here such argument for the differential games situation.
On exit-time/exit-costs differential games
In this section we briefly recall the results of Bagagiolo-Maggistro-Zoppello [2] , which will be used in the next sections.
Let us consider two open domains Ω X ⊆ R n , Ω Y ⊆ R m , with C 2 boundary and two decoupled controlled dynamics, in R n and R m respectively
where for given compact sets A, B
f, g are bounded and continuous and there exists L > 0 such that for all
We also consider the following functions
with the assumption that 1 , 2 , Ψ X , Ψ Y , Ψ XY are bounded and continuous and that there exists L > 0 such that for every a ∈ A, b ∈ B fixed, and for all
We consider the differential game given by the cost, for
where λ > 0 and, for α ∈ A, β ∈ B, X(·), Y (·) are the trajectories given by (5) , sometimes also denoted as X(·; x, α), Y (·; y, β),
and, of course, inf ∅ = +∞ and e −∞ Ψ := 0 Roughly speaking, the cost is paid as the integral of the discounted running cost up to the first exit-time of one of the two trajectories X and Y from its set of reference, Ω X and Ω Y , respectively. And then a discounted exit cost is paid, which is given by three different exit costs, Ψ X , Ψ Y , Ψ XY , depending whether player X only exits from Ω X (i.e. τ x < τ y ), or player Y only exits from Ω Y (i.e. τ y < τ x ), or they both simultaneously exit from their closed reference sets (i.e. τ x = τ y ).
The exit-time/exit-costs differential game is given by the fact that X wants to minimize J and Y wants to maximize it. We then define the non-anticipating strategies for player X and for player Y respectively as:
The lower and upper value functions are respectively defined as, for (
Similarly to the non-anticipating strategies, we define a non-anticipating tuning for both players: a non-anticipating tuning is any function K → K, k →k, where K is either A or B, such that
Note the difference: a non-anticipating strategy is a function from the set of measurable controls for one player to the set of measurable controls for the other player; a non-anticipating tuning is a function from the set of measurable controls for one player to itself.
We then assume the following controllability and compatibility hypotheses
where n X (x) and n Y (y) are, respectively, the outer normal unit vector to Ω X in x and to Ω Y in y.
Finally, we define, respectively, the upper Hamiltonian and the lower Hamiltonian for (x, y, p, q) (6)-(12), the value functions v and v are bounded and continuous in Ω X × Ω Y . Moreover they are, respectively, the unique bounded and continuous function u : Ω X × Ω Y → R which satisfies, in the viscosity sense, the following Dirichlet problems for the Isaacs equations
where ∇ x and ∇ y stay, respectively, for the gradient with respect to the x ∈ R n variable, and the gradient with respect to the y ∈ R m variable.
In [2] , an ad-hoc definition of viscosity solution is given and used, especially for what concerns the boundary conditions, and in order to suitably treat the min-max feature of the problem and the separation of the three exist costs. By a solution in the viscosity sense of the problem (13) (and similarly for (14)), we mean the following: let ϕ ∈ C 1 (Ω X × Ω Y ) and (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Ω X × Ω Y , then the following facts i) and ii) hold true: i) if (x 0 , y 0 ) is a point of local maximum for u − ϕ, with respect to Ω X × Ω Y , then we have the following four implications (one per every line)
ii) if (x 0 , y 0 ) is a point of local minimum for u − ϕ, with respect to Ω X × Ω Y , then we have the following four implications (one per every line)
The implications given by the second, third and fourth lines of (15)-(16) represent the boundary conditions in the viscosity sense.
Remark 3 Note that in the definition of the boundary conditions in viscosity sense here above, the exit cost Ψ XY for the simultaneous exit of both players, actually does not play any role. This is a consequence of the compatibility condition in (12) , which is, in some sense, a sort of stability: the exit cost for the minimizing player is larger than the cost of the maximizing one.
For the continuity and uniqueness results of Theorem 2, very important roles are played by the decoupled feature of the dynamics (5) and of the running cost (7), by the controllability and compatibility conditions in (12) , and by the regularity of the boundaries.
In particular, for what concerns the continuity, in [2] it is proved that, under hypotheses (6)-(12), the following property holds:
for every T > 0, for every K ⊂ R n × R m compact, there exist δ > 0 and a modulus of continuity O T,K , and: I) for every (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ K ∩ (Ω X × Ω Y ), with (x 1 , y 1 ) − (x 2 , y 2 ) ≤ δ there exists a non-anticipating tuning β → β from B to itself, and there exists a way to associate γ ∈ Γ to any γ ∈ Γ, such that, for every β ∈ B, γ ∈ Γ, we have
whereτ = min{τ x2 (γ[β]), τ y1 (β), T }, and Jτ is the integral of the discounted running cost up to the timeτ :
τ 0 e −λt dt. II) Similarly it holds reversing the roles of X and Y , γ ∈ Γ and ξ ∈ Ξ, α ∈ A and β ∈ B. We point out that the construction of β and of γ are made independently on the behavior of the other player. That is, β(t) and γ[β] are dependent only on the behavior, up to the time t, of the trajectories Y (·; y 1 , β) and X(·; x 2 , γ[β]), respectively. This is possible essentially due to the decoupling feature in the controls of the running cost (7) (see [2] , section 7, Remark 12).
Note that i) means that the trajectory starting from x 1 with control γ[β] does not exit before the trajectory starting from x 2 with control γ[β], and moreover, the difference of the two exit instants are controlled by the initial distance of the points; ii) means that the trajectory starting from y 2 with control β does not exit before the trajectory starting from y 1 with control β, and the difference is controlled by the initial distance; iii), iv), v) mean that the distance of those (and other similar) trajectories and their costs are controlled by the initial distances. Of course, if τ x2 (γ[β]) = +∞, then both trajectories never exit, and similarly if τ y1 (β) = +∞.
This property is essential in order to prove the continuity. Under the hypotheses here stated, its validity is proven in [2] (see Assumption 2, points 3) and 7) of Proposition 3, and (7)-(10)), suitably adapting the construction in Soner [26] to the non-anticipating framework.
We are going to use (17) in the next sections.
The switching infinite horizon differential game
The decoupled controlled dynamics of the players are respectively given by
where each dynamics is affected by a delayed thermostatic switching rule.
Here and in the sequel we will assume the following hypotheses and use the following notations:
Main Assumptions
• X(t) = X(t; x, w, α) ∈ R n , Y (t) = Y (t; y, z, β) ∈ R m are the states at time t of the player X and player Y whose evolution is given by the trajectories of (18), respectively (here and in the sequel, the names of the players will be identified with the names of their state variable);
• h ρ and h η are delayed switching thermostat with thresholds ρ −1 < ρ 1 and η −1 < η 1 , respectively:
• W (t) = W (t; x, w, α) ∈ {−1, 1} and Z(t) = Z(t; y, z, β) ∈ {−1, 1} are the switching variables, with evolution given by (18), respectively;
• ζ X ∈ R n , ζ Y ∈ R m are unit vectors; X · ζ X , Y · ζ Y are scalar products in R n and R m , respectively, and represent the input functions t → X(t) · ζ X , t → Y (t) · ζ Y to which, via the delayed thermostats, the switching laws of the variables W and Z are subject;
• A, B (the sets of constants controls), A, B (the sets of measurable controls), Γ and Ξ (the sets of non-anticipating strategies) are defined as in (6) and (10); a non-anticipating tuning k →k is defined as in (11); 
is the running cost, decoupled in the controls, where 1 and 2 are continuous, bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to the state variables; in particular ∃ M, L > 0 such that ∀x, y, x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 , w, z, a, b:
• λ > 0 is the discount factor.
We consider an infinite horizon discounted problem where, as usual, X wants to minimize and Y wants to maximizes a cost of the form
Note that the cost J is also depending on the switching variables W and Z.
We then define the lower and upper value functions as, respectively 
In order to simplify notations, we assume that ζ X and ζ Y are the first unit canonical vectors, so that X 1 = X · ζ X and Y 1 = Y · ζ Y are the first coordinates of X and Y , respectively. Let us consider the evolution of X given by (18) . We can interpret such an evolution as a switching evolution governed by two dynamics-modes, f (·, 1, ·) and f (·, −1, ·), where the switching between the two modes is governed by the delayed thermostat h ρ subject to the evolution of X 1 . Similarly, the evolution of the player Y given by (18) , which is affected by the delayed thermostat h η subject to the evolution of Y 1 , switches between the two dynamics g(·, 1, ·) and g(·, −1, ·). The behavior of the projection on the first coordinates of X and Y respectively is described by Figure 2 . For example, for given controls α ∈ A, and β ∈ B, the filled curve is the evolution with dynamics (f (·, −1, α), g(·, 1, β)), the short dashed curve is the evolution with (f (·, 1, α), g(·, 1, β)), the long dashed curve is the evolution with (f (·, 1, α), g(·, −1, β)) and the point-dashed one is the evolution with (f (·, −1, α), g(·, −1, β)). As it is easily deduced by the trajectories described in Figure 2 , the state space R n × R m can be divided in 4 (non-disjointed, but overlapped) closed sectors, every one indexed by the corresponding 2-string (w, z) of 1 and −1. More precisely
When we start to move inside one of the sectors, then we continue to move in the same mode (f (·, w, ·), g(·, z, ·)) until we leave that sector, and after that we move in the new modality (corresponding to the index of the new sector) determined by the delayed thermostatic switching rules h ρ and h η .
In the next section we are going to interpret the switching infinite horizon problem as four exittime/exit-costs problems, one per every sectors, and coupled by mutually exchanged exit-costs. In order to recast such exit-time/exit-costs problems in the framework of Section 3, let us note that every sector is of the form
that is the boundaries are the switching thresholds points (and the threshold is crossed when the first component crosses it). Moreover, we also require the following controllability assumption
where f 1 and g 1 are, respectively, the first component of the dynamics f and g. Note that (21) means that, when X or Y are in a switching threshold, then, due to the decoupled feature of the dynamics, they can freely choose whether to switch or not (remember that a switch occur only when the threshold is bypassed).
Finally, note that whenever a finite time T > 0, is fixed, then any pair of switching trajectories (W, Z) given by (18) can switch only an a-priori bounded finite number of times in [0, T ]. This is true because the dynamics are bounded and the thresholds are disjoint: for example, the trajectory X 1 needs a uniform positive time t > 0 in order to pass from ρ −1 to ρ 1 and vice-versa. Let N T > 0 be such an a-priori bound for the number of switches in [0, T ]. For every (x, y, w, z) and every control α ∈ A, β ∈ B, and for every T > 0 we then have a finite sequence of switching instants (possibly empty, if the trajectories never switch) in [0, T ]:
with N = N X + N Y + N XY ≤ N T , and where τ X correspond to switches of X only, τ Y to switches of Y only, and τ XY to simultaneous switches of X and Y (which means τ X = τ Y ). We can merge such three sequences, in order to get a unique sequence
Moreover, we denote by (w, z) i the new values of the switching variables after the i-th switch, i = 1, . . . , N , and define (w, z) 0 = (w, z). We have
where (X i−1 , Y i−1 ) is the trajectory starting from (X(τ i−1 ), Y (τ i−1 ), (w, z) i−1 ) with controls (α i−1 (·), β i−1 (·)) = (α(· + τ i−1 ), β(· + τ i−1 )). Using the representation (24) , in the spirit of (17), we now construct a non-anticipating tuning and a non-anticipating strategy which work for our switching problem. Take µ > 0 such that if a trajectory switches at time τ , then it does not switch in the time interval [τ, τ + µ]. Take T > 0 and K ⊂ R n × R m compact. Fix (w, z) and (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ K ∩ B (w,z) such that (x 1 , y 1 ) − (x 2 , y 2 ) ≤ δ, where δ is as in (17) , and moreover such that O T,K (e LT δ) < µ/2. Take β ∈ B and γ ∈ Γ. By (17) , with the notations of (22), we get the non-anticipating tuning β 0 and the non-anticipating strategy γ 0 such that
where
Our goal is to estimate the difference of the two J T costs. If τ 1 = T , then we are done. Otherwise, we have some cases. We analyze some of them, being the others similarly treated.
1) Suppose that, using the notation of (23),
By (25) , this implies that all four switchings occur in a lap of time not grater than 2O T,K ( (x 1 , y 1 )− (x 2 , y 2 ) ) < µ, which also implies that, in the meanwhile, no trajectory can switch two times. We then have the pairs (X 1 (τ 3 ), −w), X 2 (τ 4 ), −w), as well as the pairs (
At the instant τ 3 , X 1 updates its non-anticipating strategy using γ 1 , as given in the view of (17), referring to the points (X 1 (τ 3 ), −w), (X 2 (τ 3 ), −w), to the trajectory X 2 (·; X 2 (τ 3 ), −w, γ[β](· + τ 3 )]), and with respect the exit from Ω 
Note that such constructions are non-anticipating in the sense of (10), (11), because they use already given non-anticipating constructions and glue them in dependence of the behavior of the trajectories (solutions of (18)), which are non-anticipating (the state-position only depends on the past behavior).
Let τ 5 ≥ τ 4 be a possible subsequent switching of one of the trajectories when continuing to move withβ andγ[β]. Hence, looking to (24), we have
Note that, by semigroup properties and definition of γ 1 , for t ≥ 0, γ 1 [β](· + τ 4 − τ 3 ) corresponds to the non-anticipating strategy constructed for X 1 as in (17), taking the points (X 1 (τ 4 ), −w), (X 2 (τ 4 ), −w) as references, together with the trajectory X 2 (·; X 2 (τ 4 ), −w, γ[β](· + τ 4 )), and with respect to the exit from Ω −w X and the time interval [τ 4 , T ]. By (25) and a similar estimate for J (τ 5 −τ 4 ) , the difference in the second line and the one in the fourth and fifth lines of (28), are bounded by O K,Y (e LT (x 1 , y 1 ) − (x 2 , y 2 ) ), whereas the addenda inside the summation in the third line are all bounded by 2M O K,Y ( (x 1 , y 1 ) − (x 2 , y 2 ) ) because they consist of integrals of in time interval with length less than O K,Y ( (x 1 , y 1 ) − (x 2 , y 2 ) ), and is bounded by M .
2) Suppose that, using the notation as in the case 1) here above,
). Then it is certainly
where max{τ 2 − τ 1 , τ 4 − τ 3 } ≤ O T,K ( (x 1 , y 1 ) − (x 2 , y 2 ) ). In this case, X 1 update its nonanticipating strategy at τ 3 and Y 2 at τ 4 , as in the case 1). As in this case, for a subsequent switching instant τ 5 , the differences between the costs J (τ i −τ i−1 ) are all estimated in a similar way as in (28). Putting together cases 1) and 2) and the others which are similarly treated, and in particular considering that, in the time interval [0, T ] there can be only a finite number of switching N T , wethen get that the following: Proposition 4 Given the Main Assumptions and (21), then, for any T > 0, for any K ⊂ R n ×R m compact there exist δ > 0 and a modulus of continuity ω T,K such that for every (w, z) and for every (x 1 , w 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ B (w,z) ∩ K with (x 1 , y 1 ) − (x 2 , y 2 ) ≤ δ, there exist a way to associateγ ∈ Γ to any γ ∈ Γ and a non-anticipating tuning β →β on B such that
Similarly it holds reversing the roles of X and Y , α ∈ A and β ∈ B, γ ∈ Γ and ξ ∈ Ξ. Proof: We prove the proposition for V , being the proof for V similar. We are going to use the notations of Section 4.
Continuity and switched DPP
The boundedness of V is easily seen, by the boundedness of and the positivity of the discount factor λ > 0.
Let us fix ε > 0 and take T > 0 such that, for all possible trajectories and controls entering the cost , it is +∞ T e −λt dt ≤ ε. Moreover take a compact K ⊂ R n × R m , and, for a fixed pair (w, z) take (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ B (w,z) ∩ K such that (x 1 , y 1 ) − (x 2 , y 2 ) ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is given in Proposition 4, with respect to T and K.
Take γ 2 ∈ Γ which realizes V (x 2 , y 2 , w, z) up to an ε-error, and considerγ 2 ∈ Γ as the one in Proposition 4, with respect to T, K, (w, z), and (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ). We get
where, β 1 ∈ B realizes the supremum in the first addendum of the second line up to an ε-error, andβ 1 is as in Proposition 4 as before. Recalling the definition of T , using again Proposition 4, and continuing with the inequalities (30), we get
from which, as usual, by the arbitrariness of ε > 0, of the compact K and of the points, we get the required continutiy. 
Proof. We only prove the equality for V . We recall that, in our definition, the switching occurs when the threshold is by passed. This is the reason for which we consider instants a little bit larger than the switching time, see τ n here below. We will also use the estimates (34) which will be discussed in the next section.
Let us denote by p = (x, y, w, z) ∈ B (w,z) × {(w, z)} any admissible state and, by p p (·; γ[β], β) the corrresponding trajectory. Let us denote by ω(p) the right-hand side of the equality.
Let us fix ε > 0 and, and for any p let γ p ∈ Γ be such that
For every natural number n > 0, let us take γ n ∈ Γ such that 
For β ∈ B, we defining p n = p p (τ n ; γ n [β], β), and δ n ∈ Γ as
Arguing as in Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [4] page 437-438, we eventually get
By the arbitrariness of ε > 0 the claim is proved if we prove that ω n (p) − ω(p) ≤ O(1/n) as n → +∞, where O is an infinitesimal function as its argument tends to zero. For ε > 0, take γ ε ∈ Γ and β ε ∈ B such that
where τ ε is the first switching instant, depending on γ ε and β ε . In particular,
and p switched = (X(τ ε ), Y (τ ε ), (w, z) + ). In order to estimate the second member in (31), we essentially need to compare the values V (p n ) and V (p switched ), which may have different switching variables, if p n has an immediate switching after the one of p switch at time τ ε . We denote p switch = (X(τ ε ), Y (τ ε ), w, z). It is not restrictive to assume that γ ε is such that, whenever for some β it is
, then there exists ζ > 0 such that the trajectory does not switch again (that is X does not switch) in ]τ ε , τ ε + ζ[ (if ζ is sufficiently small, then certainly Y does not switch again because it has just switched and hence, to do that, it needs to reach the other threshold). Indeed, we can consider γ ε defined as
where a 0 is inward-pointing in (X(τ ε ), w), and we have that γ ε still satisfies (32). We can then always assume that, if
where (w n , z n ) is the actual switching variable of p n . Since (w n , z n ) = (w, z) + for large n whenever p swtich ∈ ∂Ω w X × ∂Ω z Y × {(w, z)}, as well as whenever p swtich ∈ ∂Ω w X × ∂Ω z Y × {(w, z)} and (w, z) = (−w, −z), in these three cases, by the continuity of V , we get the convergence V (p n ) → V (p switched ). Two other cases remain when p switch ∈ ∂Ω w X × ∂Ω z Y × {(w, z)}. In both we use (34) and the continuity of V .
where, in 2) we used the fact that, by (34), it cannot be V (p switched ) > V (X(τ ε ), Y (τ ε ), −w, −z), and that, if (w, z) + = (w, −z) it cannot be (w n , z n ) = (−w, z) because z is already switched at the time τ ε . Hence, in any case we get V (p switched ) ≥ V (p n ) + O 1 n and, by the obvious convergence of the integrals in (31), we get the desired estimate.
Claim: V (x, y, w, z) ≥ ω(x, y, w, z).
Arguing as in Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [4] page 437-438 we can prove that (with the same notations as in the previous step), for any ε > 0
The conclusion then still holds because we also have ω(p) − ω n (p) ≤ O(1/n). Indeed, reversing the roles of ω and ω n in (31),(32), we have that if, (w n , z n ) = (−w, z) or (w n , z n ) = (w, −z) then (w, z) + = (w n , z n ); moreover if (w n , z n ) = (−w, −z) for all n then also (w, z) + = (−w, −z). 6 The HJI systems and uniqueness By Proposition 6, for every (w, z) ∈ {−1, 1}, on B (w,z) the lower value function V of the infinite horizon problem can be interpreted as the lower value function of the exit-time/exit-costs differential game with dynamics (x, a) → f (x, w, a), (y, b) → g(y, z, b), running cost (x, y, a, b) → (x, y, w, z, a, b) and exit costs (using the same notations as in Section 3)
and similarly for the upper value function V . Moreover, under the controllability hypothesis (21) such costs satisfy the compatibility hypothesis in (12), here stated for
Indeed, consider the double switched state (x, y, −w, −z). Since X minimizes, and since from the Y -only switched state (x, y, w, −z) it may freely decide to switch or not, it is where the boundary conditions must be also interpreted in the viscosity sense as in (15)- (16) . Endowed with the uniform convergence topology, C is a complete metric space. Also note that V , V ∈ C. We prove the uniqueness results for the system (36) corresponding to the case H (w,z) = U H (w,z) (i.e. the case solved by V ). The other case is similar.
The construction of the functional is performed in three steps. First step. We construct a functional T 1 : C → X in the following way. Given u ∈ C, for every (w, z) fixed, the functions u(·, ·, −w, z), u(·, ·, −w, −z) and u(·, ·, w, −z) give suitable boundary conditions for the sub-problem in (36) with that (w, z) fixed (also compare with (35)). In particular, they are continuous and satisfy (37). Let us denote by T 1 [u; w, z] : B (w,z) → R such a unique solution. By Theorem 2, T 1 [u; w, z] is the lower value function of the exit-time exit cost differential game with dynamics (x, a) → f (x, w, a), (y, b) → g(y, z, b), running cost (x, y, a, b) → (x, y, w, z, a, b) and exit costs given by the values of u as before. Hence, we define the image of u ∈ C via T 1 as Note that, in case of exit in finite time, if w + = −w then X(τ ) has a distance from ∂Ω −w X equal to 0 < ρ 1 − ρ −1 , if z + = −z then Y (τ ) has a distance from ∂Ω −z Y equal to 0 < η 1 − η −1 . Applying the same reasoning to T 2 , we obtain:
Similarly for the other cases. By the arbitrariness of ε > 0 and of the point (x, y, w, z), setting
we get
Remark 8 By the uniqueness Theorem 7, whenever the Hamiltonians LH and U H are equal, then we get V = V , that is the differential game has an equilibrium. As usual, the equality of the Hamiltonians can be assured by some particular structure of the running cost , for example if, besides the already assumed decoupling feature as in the Main Assumptions in Section 4, it is also of the form (x, y, w, z, a, b) = 1 (x, y, w, z) + 2 (a) + 3 (b).
